Clean Install, Stolen Creds: Fake WatchGuard VPN Site Serves Genuine Signed Client
A fake WatchGuard VPN download site steals SSL VPN credentials, then serves the real signed client. Learn how it works and how to spot it.
James is a Senior Security Operations Analyst at Huntress. James brings a passion for problem-solving and a knack for cybersecurity to the team. Before joining Huntress, he worked in cybersecurity for the Royal Australian Navy, where he gained hands-on experience with large-scale monitoring, threat detection, and incident response in high-pressure environments. At Huntress, James focuses on malware analysis and reverse engineering, tackling live threats with curiosity and precision.
He’s currently studying for a Bachelor of Science in Cybersecurity at Edith Cowan University and holds the GIAC Reverse Engineering Malware (GREM) certification. James loves being part of a team that gets the job done, while constantly learning in an ever-changing field.
Outside of work, he enjoys exploring the intersection where cyber meets the physical world—how engineering blends with technology in unique ways. His top cybersecurity tip? “Always approach the internet with a healthy level of skepticism. Never take things at face value, stay curious, question what you see, and always look a little deeper.”
A fake WatchGuard VPN download site steals SSL VPN credentials, then serves the real signed client. Learn how it works and how to spot it.
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