Several high-profile attacks in recent years have relied on some form of social engineering. The MGM/Caesar incident in 2023 and the Harrod and Co-op attacks in 2025 resulted in the loss of millions of dollars. If employees and third-party vendors had recognized the early vishing and phishing signals, these attacks could likely have been contained earlier and their impact reduced.
Here are a few scenarios to help you spot threats before they happen.
When emails look exactly right
In the Harrod and Co-op attacks, members of Scattered Spider used open source intelligence (OSINT) to comb through public information in order to impersonate employees. Through emails sent to the companies’ IT departments, the attackers requested MFA and password reset links for already compromised accounts. This allowed them full control over multiple accounts before moving easily throughout the company's infrastructure.
Hackers don’t just send a random phishing email to the IT help desk and hope for the best—they gradually build rapport with victims through innocent-sounding messages about setting up an account or struggling with a new device. Another common tactic is urgency: Sometimes these emails ask employees to skip normal approval channels to get a high-priority task done. In reality, they’re gaining unauthorized access to company data.
When the caller sounds completely legitimate
In the MGM attack, Scattered Spider used voice phishing (vishing) to gain access to an administrator account before injecting it with ransomware. After researching MGM employees on LinkedIn and choosing victims to impersonate, attackers called and successfully convinced the IT helpdesk to reset credentials and bypass MFA for an administrator account, giving them the access they needed to move laterally and deploy ransomware. To get away with it, the attackers needed just enough information and an overly eager desk agent to pick up the phone.
The one early signal in this scenario? The phone call. As soon as the caller asked for login credentials, the agent should’ve hung up the phone and reported the incident. An employee with proper SAT training would know to never share credentials over the phone—there are user-initiated systems for password and MFA resets for a reason.
When the social engineering is physical
Tailgating through a secure door and posing as a delivery person are common examples of physical social engineering. This gives attackers in-person access to your building where they can plug into your network or leave behind malware-infected USBs.
Simple attempts like this shouldn’t work; train employees to check the badges and credentials of anyone entering, and keep an eye out for suspicious activity or individuals. Improving on-site security, like incorporating a badge checkpoint, can help you prevent an in-person attack before it starts.